

Intelligence report supporting the assessment that war is not about to break out -

1. The fact remains that at the end of 1962 and even in the days prior to the Yom Kippur war Egypt had not established the capability of arial superiority over the Israeli AirForce. The Israeli assessment is that Egypt would not go to war unless it could assure its own ability to attack deep within Israel, specifically the ability to ground the Israeli air force. This assessment was strengthened when Ashraf Marwan who started spying for Israel in December 1970 shared internal documents detailing Egyptian leadership meetings with their Soviet counterparts, and from the offices of President Sadat which showed that Egypt saw itself as not capable of going to war until it received enough long-distance fighter jets (I.e., Mig-23) in order to hit IDF forces. They demanded 'deterrent weapons ' - land to land 'Scud' missiles that would threaten the Israeli mainland and prevent the IDF from attacking targets deep within Egypt. *A document that the source issued on the evening of October 5th, 1973, less than 24 hours before the Yom Kippur war broke out, when all the signs pointed toward imminent war with Egypt and Syria which was authored by commander Yona Benderman stated the following: "Despite the general agreement among national security experts that the Suez front is preparing for an offensive, our best assessment is that no change has occurred in the balance of power between the IDF and Egyptian forces. Therefore, the likelihood that Egypt plans to initiate war is low.
2. Assessment that Egypt will not initiate war alone without Syria and that Egypt does not see itself prepared for war :
In September of 1970, about a month after the close of the Hatasha war the president of Egypt, Gamal Abd Nasser died. He was replaced by one of his aids, Anwar Sadaat. Sadaat continued in Nasser's footsteps and highlighted the importance of returning the Sinai to Egyptian control, but he understood that the Egyptian military was not strong enough to recapture it. Israeli intelligence sources had a good sense of what was happening in Egypt at the time and Sadaat was perceived as weak and not experienced. The consensus (nicknamed the 'Conception') identified the minimum level of military might that Egypt would need to go to war with Israel. Egypt had not yet reached this level of readiness, and therefore war will not break out.
3. Egypt's foreign relations department released a statement informing the world and Israel that the draft and military exercises are nothing other than regular training. These notifications were in line with the events on the Suez line such that even the Israelis were lulled into the belief that there was no threat .
The successful Egyptian misinformation campaign enabled them to strengthen their forces significantly without raising too much concern. Since the Hatasha war (1967-1970) Egypt maintained nearly five (5) divisions on the Suez, therefore they did not need a wholesale draft to build up their presence there.
4. When Commander David Elazar reported for his reserve service (Blue & White preparedness), in May of 1973 he claimed that there would not be a war – contradicting the opinion of Elis Zaira, who was the head of intelligence. And indeed, war did not break out, strengthening the opinion that it would not occur in October either.

5. The Egyptian president demanded the evacuation of the Russian experts and contractors on July 11th, 1972. Israeli intelligence reports indicated that this was done by Sadat as an effort to gain favor with the United States. In fact, the Soviets leaving Egypt weakens Egypt and lowers the risk of war.
6. Considering the intelligence reports gathered by the special forces of the IDF on the borders, there is no indication of impending war.