

## **Intelligence report that war is about to break out –**

1. In April of 1973 there were reports that Syria received several fighter jets from Libya and Iraq.
2. The Northern command received intelligence reports late in 1972 indicating that the Syrians have started preparing positions for their 130 millimeter rockets whose range includes the entire Golan Heights and Northern Galilee regions.
3. Early in 1973 the Syrians changed their military preparedness routine. Until then, they would thin out their forces toward the winter months (September-October) and add forces to the front line in the spring (March-April). But this time, instead of reducing their forces, they increased them.
4. In July aerial photographs made it clear that the Syrians started preparing dozens of outposts to install rocket launchers. At the same time, they moved their anti-aircraft defenses from Damascus to the Golan Heights. During the same month, a secret communiqué was issued by the Israeli air force warning that once the Syrian rockets are operational, the Air Force would lose much of its ability to operate freely in most of the Golan. This would mean that the Air force would not be able to protect Israeli forces properly. By the end of August, nearly 30 rocket launchers had been set up, half of which were SA6 rockets.
5. At the same time, trenches designed to host the heavy 240-millimeter mortars were discovered. These rockets were designed by the Russians to target armored vehicles.
6. In August and September, the Syrian forces began an exceptionally unusual buildup of their tank and mortar forces.
7. About six weeks before the war intelligence reports began indicating that Egypt and Syria are preparing for war. Isaac Hofi, the chief of the Northern command warned that the Syrian forces will be ready to attack by September 24th, 1973.
8. During a meeting between Golda Meir and King Hussain of Jordan on September 25th, the king reported that Egypt and Syria intend to attack Israel in the near future. This information was passed along within the intelligence community but was not taken seriously.
9. Family members of Russian advisors left Syria and Egypt in a hastily organized airlift. Israeli intelligence officers discovered that the main exodus occurred on October 4th, 1973. Such a move indicates a serious concern of imminent war breaking out.
10. The CIA also informed Israel of their intelligence assessment that Syria plans to attack imminently.
11. On October 5th, Tzvi Zamir, the head of the Mossad met with the agent Asraf Marwan and received detailed plans and timeframe when the enemy states planned to begin the offensive. He urgently passed along the information to the government.
12. Intelligence gathering flights and land-based outlooks reported that final preparations for attack were being put into place on the Syrian front and on the banks of the Suez Canal.
13. Aviezer Yeari, Israel's head of intelligence on Syria warned that the Syrian forces are on the cusp of being ready for the upcoming war.
14. The scheduled 'Tachrir 14' training exercise did not take place as expected and the Egyptian forces received orders to eat despite Ramadan, and maintain a high level of physical strength.
15. The IDF intelligence corps presented an abundance of data gathered in the months, weeks, and days before the war indicating beyond reasonable doubt that Egypt and

Syria plan to attack. The sources of the intelligence reports were reliable and of unusually high caliber.