

The Egyptian president demanded the evacuation of the Russian experts and contractors on July 11th, 1972. Israeli intelligence reports indicated that this was done by Sadat as an effort to gain favor with the United States. In fact, the soviets leaving Egypt weakens Egypt and lowers the risk of war

The fact remains that at the end of 1962 and even in the days prior to the Yom Kippur war Egypt had not established the capability of arial superiority over the Israeli AirForce. The Israeli assessment is that Egypt would not go to war unless it could assure its own ability to attack deep within Israel, specifically the ability to ground the Israeli air force.

The military activity on the border with Egypt and the mobilization of the reserves are regular trainings for crossing a canal.

Three years have passed since the war of attrition (1967-1970), and although there are many forces, .peace has been maintained

**There is no war
warning from the
IDF's "special means"
at the borders.**

war is not about to break out

When Commander David Elazar reported for his reserve service (Blue & White preparedness), in May of 1973 he claimed that there would not be a war – contradicting the opinion of Elis Zaira, who was the head of intelligence. And indeed, war did not break out, strengthening the opinion that it would not occur in October either

Family members of Russian advisors left Syria and Egypt in a hastily organized airlift. Israeli intelligence officers discovered that the main exodus occurred on October 4th, 1973. Such a move indicates a serious concern of imminent war breaking out

In July aerial photographs made it clear that the Syrians started preparing dozens of outposts to install rocket launchers. At the same time, they moved their anti-aircraft defences from Damascus to the Golan Heights. During the same month, a secret communiqué was issued by the Israeli air force warning that once the Syrian rockets are operational, the Air Force would lose much of its ability to operate freely in most of the Golan. This would mean that the Air force would not be able to protect Israeli forces properly. By the end of August, nearly 30 rocket launchers had been set up, half of which were SA6 rockets.

During a meeting between Golda Meir and King Hussain of Jordan on September 25th, the king reported that Egypt and Syria intend to attack Israel in the near future. This information was passed along within the intelligence community but was not taken seriously.

On October 5th, Tzvi Zamir, the head of the Mossad met with the agent Asraf Marwan and received detailed plans and timeframe when the enemy states planned to begin the offensive. He urgently passed along the information to the government.

war is about to break out

The IDF intelligence corps presented an abundance of data gathered in the months, weeks, and days before the war indicating beyond reasonable doubt that Egypt and Syria plan to attack. The sources of the intelligence reports were reliable and of unusually high caliber.